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Cynicism in negotiation: When communication increases buyers’
skepticism
Eyal Ert∗ Stephanie Creary† Max H. Bazerman‡
Abstract
The economic literature on negotiation shows that strategic concerns can be a barrier to agreement, even when the buyer
values the good more than the seller. Yet behavioral research demonstrates that human interaction can overcome these
strategic concerns through communication. We show that there is also a downside of this human interaction: cynicism.
Across two studies we focus on a seller-buyer interaction in which the buyer has uncertain knowledge about the goods for
sale, but has a positive expected payoff from saying “yes” to the available transaction. Study 1 shows that most buyers
accept offers made by computers, but that acceptance rates drop significantly when offers are made by human sellers who
communicate directly with buyers. Study 2 clarifies that this effect results from allowing human sellers to communicate
with buyers, and shows that such communication focuses the buyers’ attention on the seller’s trustworthiness. The mere
situation of negotiated interaction increases buyers’ attention to the sellers’ self-serving motives and, consequently, buyers’
cynicism. Unaware of this downside of interaction, sellers actually prefer to have the opportunity to communicate with
buyers.
Keywords: trust, information asymmetry, perspective-taking, reactive devaluation.
1 Introduction
Economic models of strategic interactions show that com-
pletely rational negotiators can fail to reach an agreement
despite the existence of a range of possible agreements
that would make both parties better off (Myerson & Sat-
terthwaite, 1983). The simple intuition behind this finding
is that, if the range of mutually beneficial agreements is
small, then the efforts of each party to get a somewhat
bigger slice of the pie, which each hopes is bigger than it
actually can be, may result in impasse. In contrast, behav-
ioral research shows that communication between players
allows negotiators to outperform the expectation of eco-
nomic models, due to the human tendency to value truth-
telling, the potential for lie detection, and the desire to re-
ciprocate what appears to be honest communication from
the other side (Bazerman, Gibbons, Thompson & Valley,
1998; Valley, Thompson, Gibbons, & Bazerman, 2002).
This previous research focuses on the positive virtues of
human social interactions. The current paper explores the
potential downside of such interactions: cynicism. That
is, we examine whether negotiators fail to reach mutually
beneficial agreements as a result of the buyers being cyni-
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cal about the sellers simply because they want to sell.
From an economic perspective, in a game where a seller
wants to sell a fixed bundle of goods for a price to a buyer,
and the parties will have no future interactions, communi-
cation is merely “cheap talk” (Farrell & Gibbons, 1989).
That is, when the agents’ incentives are not aligned, cost-
less, and non-binding, non-verifiable messages should be
ignored by the other side, as they are unlikely to be re-
alized (Farrel & Rabin, 1996).1 Despite this fact, Val-
ley et al. (2002) show that “cheap” communication can
be useful in negotiation, even when parties have no op-
portunity for future interaction; the credibility of informa-
tion exchanged through discussion allows more deals to
go through than an economic model would predict. We
explore the question of whether Valley et al.’s (2002) ex-
ploration of the virtue of communication was one-sided—
that is, whether communicating comes with potential costs
and not just benefits.
Specifically, we focus on contexts in which sellers have
better information about their products than buyers do.
Such contexts are quite common, ranging from markets
for second-hand products, such as used cars and houses,
to various goods or services being offered on the internet.
Importantly, transactions that involve such information
asymmetry give sellers the opportunity to sell “lemons”
(i.e., bad-quality products; see Akerlof, 1970). Rational
buyers, aware of sellers’ motives, should be reluctant to
trade in such cases.
1The more incentives are aligned, the more informative cheap talk
becomes (e.g., Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Farrel & Rabin, 1996).
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In reality, buyers are not only willing to trade, but of-
ten act too naïvely. They tend to overlook sellers’ self-
serving motives, fall prey to the “winner’s curse” by buy-
ing lemon products, and pay far more than a product is
worth (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985; Ball, Bazerman, &
Carroll, 1991). According to one explanation for this phe-
nomenon, individuals act naïvely because they fail to take
the perspective of the other party (Ball et al., 1991) and
because they trust others even when self-serving motives
make that trust irrational (e.g., Berg et al., 1995).
Yet this explanation does not account for contexts in
which people seem to be responsive to others’ motives.
One such example is the evidence for “reactive devalua-
tion” of an adversary’s pledges, as demonstrated by Amer-
ican reactions to disarmament proposals by the Russian
president during the Cold War (e.g., Ross, 1995; Ross &
Stillinger, 1991). Similarly, Freistad and Wright (1994)
suggest that consumers’ awareness of persuasion attempts
shape their perceptions of products and of the seller-buyer
relationship. For example, consumers’ knowledge of ad-
vertising tactics could backfire by causing them to resist
such persuasion efforts.
Another feasible explanation for why buyers act too
naively relates to an attentional bias. Bazerman and Chugh
(2005) suggested that many behavioral biases might reflect
individuals’ bounded awareness, which results from a mis-
alignment between the information needed to make a good
decision and the information included in conscious aware-
ness. Specifically, people tend to overrate focal events and
neglect other information that is less directly accessible,
such as information that is more readily available to the
other side in a negotiation.
Our research explores the role of a related hypothe-
sis: that certain contexts highlight the asymmetry of in-
formation in a negotiation and increase dysfunctional cyn-
icism. We move beyond previous examinations of con-
sumer cynicism, which have suggested that individuals re-
act negatively mostly following negative, similar experi-
ences with questionable offers and/or deceptive counter-
parts (e.g., Darke & Ritchie, 2007; Ert & Erev, 2008;
Freistad & Wright, 1994). The current paper examines
our hypothesis of “situational-driven cynicism” with two
studies that demonstrate how a simple change in a situa-
tion could encourage individuals to be irrationally cynical,
even when cynicism is costly to them.
1.1 The hidden card game
The studies in this paper focus on the “hidden card” game
(adapted from Rubinstein, 2012). In this game, a deck of
100 cards is marked consecutively from 1 to 100. The
game is played by a seller and a buyer, and it starts when
the seller randomly draws two cards from the deck. Then
the buyer is told about the value of the lower of the two
cards, and the buyer must decide whether to buy the two
cards from the seller at a fixed cost of E100 (E is an “Ex-
perimental dollar;” in our experiments, E1 = $0.05). The
cards’ value to the buyer is the sum of the two cards. The
seller receives E100 (the cards’ fixed price) if the buyer
accepts the transaction; otherwise the seller receives noth-
ing.
In this setting, the seller’s interest is to sell the cards re-
gardless of their value. The buyer’s interest is to buy the
cards only when they are valuable (when the sum of cards
exceeds 100). Normatively, with no additional informa-
tion, a risk-neutral buyer should buy the cards whenever
the value of the lower card exceeds 33, since at 34, all
values for the other card between 35 and 100 are equally
likely, making the sum of the two cards anywhere between
69 and 134, again, all values being equally likely. Our
analysis focuses on what buyers do when they see that the
lower card is 40, making all values for the combination
of the two cards between 81 and 140 equally likely, which
implies an expected value of E110.5 from buying at a price
of E100.
2 Study 1: Buying cards from a
computer seller or from a human
seller
To evaluate the potential role of cynicism in buyer-seller
negotiations, we compared two between-subjects condi-
tions of the hidden card game: a computer-seller condi-
tion and a human-seller condition. In the former condi-
tion, all participants were assigned to be buyers and played
the card game with a “computer seller”. In the human-
seller condition, half the participants were randomly as-
signed to be sellers. In addition, human sellers were given
one minute during which they could send text messages to
convince buyers to buy before the buyers made their de-
cisions. As the seller has incentive to sell regardless of
the product’s value to the buyer, the rational buyer should
disregard the seller’s messages as “cheap talk”. There-
fore the rate of buying should be similar between the two
conditions. We hypothesized that the mere context of in-
teracting with human sellers who were trying to convince
them to buy a “good” would increase buyers’ awareness of
sellers’ motives and consequently decrease the likelihood
they would buy cards from the sellers.
2.1 Method
One-hundred-and-twenty-four Harvard students (mostly
undergraduates) participated in the study. The participants
were assigned to either the computer-seller (N = 48) or the
human-seller (N = 76) conditions. The compensation was
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Figure 1: An example of the experimental screen (buyers) of Study 1.
contingent on participants’ choices and ranged between
$15 and $23.
Each participant was seated in front of a personal com-
puter and received written instructions (see Appendix),
which were also read aloud by the experimenter. Next,
the participants played two independent games of a com-
puterized “hidden card” game (using “Z-Tree”; see Fis-
chbacher, 2007). Buyers started the game with an initial
endowment of E200, and sellers began with E100. To
allow us to test responses to the lower card being a spe-
cific value, 40, all participants were told that in one of the
games, the value of the lower card was predetermined for
technical purposes by the computer program to be a cer-
tain number, x (participants were not told that the prede-
termined number was 40), and that the higher card would
be drawn between x+1 and 100. Participants learned that
in the other game, both cards would be randomly drawn
from between 1 and 100. They did not know which game
would include the predetermined card. At the end of the
study, one of the two games was randomly selected to de-
termine each participant’s payoff. For all participants, the
value of the lower card was 40 in their first game; the first
game was the focus of our study.2
2The second trial exists simply to allow us to set the price of the
In the computer-seller condition, all participants played
the role of buyer, and the seller was played by the com-
puter. In each game, buyers observed the lower of the two
cards and then were asked to decide whether to buy the
cards. (Figure 1 shows an example of the experimental
screen). There were no time limits for making this deci-
sion.
Participants in the human-seller condition were ran-
domly assigned to the role of buyer or seller. When the
lower card was revealed, the sellers were given one minute
for free communication with their buyers via a chat box.
Buyers and sellers were told they could write anything
they liked in these messages and that “there are no rules”
regarding true or false information they might communi-
cate. The only restriction imposed was that both buyers
and sellers had to remain anonymous; they were not al-
lowed to mention their computer station, their names, or
any other information that might identify them. Notably,
the “no rules” manipulation implied that sellers could re-
veal the higher card if they wished, but they could also
provide false information about the card’s value. Once the
minute of communication was over, buyers were asked
to indicate whether they would buy the card. As in the
lower card in the first trial, while avoiding the use of deception (Gino &
Bazerman, 2009).
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computer-seller condition, no time limits were imposed on
buyers’ decisions.
2.2 Results
We focus our analysis on the first game, in which all buy-
ers knew the lower card was 40. This allows us to con-
trol for conditional effects of the value of the lower card.
There were 48 such games in the computer-seller condi-
tion and 38 games in the human-seller condition. As iden-
tified above, lacking any additional information from the
seller, the expected value-maximizing decision is to buy
the card. Most buyers in the computer-seller condition be-
haved consistently with this rule and 79% (38 of the 48
buyers) purchased the cards. The idea that buyers dismiss
the seller’s information as cheap talk, when their incen-
tives are not aligned, implies that the buying rate in the
human-seller condition should be similar to that in the
computer-seller condition. Yet consistent with our con-
cern for cynicism in buyer-seller interactions, the results
revealed a significantly lower buying rate in the human-
seller condition, χ2 = 11.00, p < .001, in which only 45%
(17 of the 38 buyers) purchased the cards.3
The difference in buying rate between the two condi-
tions implies that buyers did not ignore the sellers’ per-
suasion attempts. Additional analyses were conducted to
better understand what information did sellers provide and
how buyers reacted to it. The results reveal that slightly
more than half the sellers (21 out of 38 sellers; 55%) re-
ported a specific value for the higher card. It seems natural
to assume that a seller who promises that the higher card
is worthwhile but does not report its explicit value might
not be trustworthy. However, there is no indication that
sellers behaved this way: reporting the value of the higher
card was not related to whether the cards were valuable or
not, r (38) = .09, NS. The results also suggest that buyers
have not followed this reasoning as well. In the 17 cases
in which the value of the higher card was not mentioned
only eight buyers (47%) purchased the cards. Yet the buy-
ing rate was not much larger (54%) even in the 13 of the 21
cases where the true value of the higher card was revealed
and was valuable.4 Notably, this buying rate was still sig-
nificantly lower from the computer-seller condition, χ2 =
5.05, p = .025, suggesting that even providing buyers with
3The results of the other game, in which the lower card was not fixed
but random, showed that when cards’ EV was positive (i.e., lower card
was above 33), all buyers purchased them (17/17) in the computer-seller
condition, while only 68% (15/22) buyers purchased them in the human-
seller condition. When their EV was negative the purchase proportions
were 6% (1/31) and 0% (0/16) in the computer and human seller condi-
tions respectively.
4In three of the 21 cases where the cards value was mentioned it was
lower than E100, and in another three cases the cards equaled exactly to
E100. Two sellers reported a high value while the cards true value was
lower than E100.
attractive and credible information did not help sellers sell
in the current context.
Buyers’ low rate of buying (54%) even when sellers re-
vealed the true value of their cards and they were indeed
valuable suggests that many buyers simply did not believe
the sellers’ claims. To evaluate the potential cost of this
disbelief, we compared buyers’ actual earnings to their
earnings under two hypothetical strategies that consider
sellers’ messages as trustworthy information. The first
strategy, the one just mentioned, assumes that the seller
is trustworthy if she mentions the specific cards’ value;
otherwise she might have something to hide. This rule im-
plies a decision to buy if and only if the seller states that
the sum of the two cards exceeds 100. Had buyers fol-
lowed this strategy, they would have earned E7.95 more,
on average, than they actually did; t(20) = 2.45, p = .024.
Since the results showed that the buying rate was not
affected by the sellers’ decision to report an explicit value
of the high card, we also considered a second strategy that
suggests “buying at 40 unless the seller advises not to”.
Had buyers followed this strategy, they would have earned
E4.18 more, on average, than they actually did; t(37) =
1.90, p = .065. Both analyses suggest that buyers’ disbe-
lief was costly. Indeed, the data show that sellers sent reli-
able information regarding the higher card’s value in 90%
of cases in which its value was mentioned; thus, retrospec-
tively, it made sense for buyers to believe their claims.
2.3 Discussion
Buyer interactions with a human seller, rather than a com-
puter seller, had a detrimental effect on the likelihood of
transaction. Illustrating the robustness of this effect, the
results show that people are less likely to buy from hu-
man sellers than they are to buy from computer sellers not
only when sellers do not add information about the card
in question, but also when information about the card is
revealed that suggests the card is valuable.
A persuasion context seems to draw more attention to
the persuader’s motives and makes buyers act more con-
servatively. From an economic perspective, since anything
the seller would communicate to the buyer in this setting is
“cheap talk”, the buyer may simply ignore the communi-
cation, and in the current setting purchase the product. The
results suggest that buyers haven’t just dismissed the sell-
ers’ communication. Such behavior would have resulted
with similar purchase rate to the computer-seller condition
where card information was not provided. The lower buy-
ing rate in the human-seller condition suggests that buyers
were actually attentive to the sellers’ claims but did not re-
ally believe them. Indeed, in some cases, buyers explicitly
expressed their disbelief while communicating with the
seller (e.g., “I think you’re lying”; “yea right, why should
I believe you?”).
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Buyers’ tendency to try to assess the seller’s trustwor-
thiness seems understandable. If buyers can correctly dis-
tinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy sellers,
then information from sellers becomes valuable. How-
ever, the results suggest that, while buyers did try to as-
sess the seller’s trustworthiness, the mere context of per-
suasion caused them to be cynical and forego profitable
transactions.
Recall that in the current study human sellers could
communicate with buyers, but computers could not. Thus,
it is possible is that the persuasion context is mainly driven
by facing human sellers, rather than machines. This hy-
pothesis seems consistent with the observation that trust-
ing strangers entails an additional risk premium compared
to taking an “equivalent” risky bet to balance the cost of
trust betrayal (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). Yet an alter-
native possibility is that the reduced level of purchase was
driven by the added communication in the human-seller
condition, rather than by the seller type. These assertions
are compared in Study 2.
3 Study 2: Is skepticism induced
by sellers’ type or by communica-
tion?
Study 1 showed that buyers in the human-seller condition
were less likely to buy than were buyers in the computer-
seller condition. Study 2 is designed to better understand
the factors that drew buyers’ attention to sellers’ motives.
One possibility is that interactions with humans drawmore
attention to sellers’ motives than do interactions with com-
puters. Another possibility is that the mere context of per-
suasion draws more attention to sellers’ motives than when
no persuasion occurs. The current study is designed to as-
sess those two possibilities. It compares behavior in the
hidden-card game in two conditions. In the “talk” con-
dition, which replicates the human-seller condition from
Study 1, buyers and sellers communicate before the trans-
action. In the “no-talk” condition buyers and sellers can-
not communicate. To evaluate what contextual factors
from the interaction with a seller might affect the buyer’s
purchase decision, buyers were asked right after they made
their decisions about their perception of the seller’s trust-
worthiness, and their confidence in their decision. Sellers
were asked about their estimation of the buyers’ likelihood
to buy in each of the experimental conditions.
3.1 Method
One hundred seventy two Harvard students participated in
the study. Eighty eight participants were assigned to the
no-talk condition and 84 participants were assigned to the
talk condition. Participants in each condition were ran-
domly assigned to be buyers or sellers. The compensa-
tion was contingent on participants’ choices and ranged
between $15 and $23.
The procedure was the same of the human-seller condi-
tion from Study 1, and the no-talk condition followed the
same procedure except that there was no communication
between buyers and sellers. Again, we used the two games
structure from Study 1 to avoid the use of deception.
Another difference from the previous study was that af-
ter making their first choice buyers in the talk condition
were asked to respond to the following questions:
1. Was the seller trustworthy to your opinion? (Yes/No)
2. How confident are you in your decision? (Answers
ranging from 1, not at all to 7, highly confident)
Buyers’ decision-time was also recorded as an addi-
tional measure for confidence under the assumption that
buyers who are more confident make faster decisions.
Sellers in the talk condition were asked: “How likely,
in your opinion, is the buyer to buy from you right now?”
(answers ranging from 1, Unlikely to 7, Very Likely). In
the no-talk condition, they were asked the following ques-
tions:
1. Suppose you could have 1 minute of free communi-
cation with the buyer, during which you could send
the buyer messages of any content, no restrictions (as
long as you would not reveal your name or anything
that might identify you). Would you prefer to have it
instead of the current situation with no communica-
tion? (Yes/No)
2. How likely, in your opinion, is the buyer to buy from
you right now? (Answers ranging from 1, Unlikely
to 7, Very Likely).
3. Suppose you would have one minute of free commu-
nication with the buyer (as described earlier). How
likely, to your opinion, the buyer would be to buy the
cards from you? (Answers ranging from 1, Unlikely
to 7, Very Likely).
3.2 Results
As in the previous study, we focus our analysis on the first
trial, in which the value of the lower card was fixed at 40.
Those results suggest that the skepticism observed among
buyers in the two studies was facilitated by communica-
tion rather than by the type of seller.5 In the talk condition,
only 23 of the 42 buyers (55%) purchased the cards. This
rate was similar to the buying rate from the human sellers
5In the second game, when EV was positive (lower card > 33), 80%
(16/20) and 88% (14/16) purchased the cards, in the talk and the no-talk
conditions respectively.
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in Study 1, and was lower than the buying rate in the no-
talk condition where 33 of the 44 buyers (75%) purchased
the cards, χ2 = 3.87, p = .035 one-tailed (by Monte Carlo
simulation).
Additional support for the effect of communication
comes from the analysis of the buyer’s perception of the
seller following the communication and its effect on the
buyer’s decision. Following communication, only 22 of
the 42 buyers (52%) perceived the seller as trustworthy,
and the buyers who believed that the seller was trustwor-
thy were more likely to buy the cards, r(42) = .38, p =
.013. Moreover, buyers who perceived the seller as trust-
worthy tended to be also more confident with their deci-
sions (r(42) = .28, p = .077, two tailed), and decided faster
than buyers who did not perceive the seller as trustworthy,
r(42) = −.26, p = .093 (two tailed).
In order to evaluate the relative effect of trustworthi-
ness and other relevant variables we regressed the de-
cision to buy on perceived seller’s trustworthiness, am-
biguous promises (a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
seller promises valuable cards but does not mention a spe-
cific value), and specific promises (a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the seller promises a specific value of the high
card). Consistent with the results of Study 1 neither the
ambiguous nor the exact promises had an effect on buying.
The only significant variable was the perceived trustwor-
thiness of the seller, Wald χ2(1) = 6.37, p = .012. Together
the results suggest that the communication might have af-
fected buyers’ decisions by focusing their attention on the
seller’s (rather than the product’s) characteristics. .
Interestingly the sellers were not aware of this detrimen-
tal effect of communication on buying. The majority of
the sellers in the no-talk condition (34 of 44 sellers; 77%)
indicated that they would like having the opportunity to
persuade buyers, and believed that their likelihood of sell-
ing would be higher if they could persuade buyers (4.57)
than if communication with buyers was not possible (3.45;
t(43) = 3.85, p < .001). Additionally, sellers who per-
suaded buyers believed that their likelihood to sell (4.36)
is significantly higher than sellers who did not (3.45; t(84)
= 2.46, p = .016).
3.3 Discussion
The current results show that the negative effect of com-
munication on purchases in the current studies could not
be attributed to the seller’s type (computer vs. human) but
seems to be facilitated by the buyer-seller communication
(see Figure 2). The results further show that a large frac-
tion of the buyers indicated that they do not trust the sellers
following their communication, and that the level of the
buyer’s trust in the seller seems to affect the buyer’s deci-
sion. It is possible that the detrimental effect of commu-
nication on trust in our studies were somewhat facilitated
Figure 2: A summary of the buying rate in the two studies
under the talk and no-talk conditions.
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by the instructions, which emphasized that “there are no
rules regarding true or false information” that sellers re-
port to buyers and that “anything is allowed”.6 However,
recall that the seller’s trustworthiness (or any other seller
characteristic for that matter) is being overweighed in the
buyer’s decision since the seller cannot really affect the
products value or its price. Nevertheless, in the context of
communication, impressions of the other party might be
too hard to ignore.
4 General discussion and conclu-
sions
Past negotiation research suggested that social interaction
provided a unique set of positive effects that improved the
ability of negotiators to reach an agreement when potential
agreements existed that would make both parties better off
(Valley et al., 2002; Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998).
The current research does not contradict the positive ef-
fects documented in this earlier line of research. Rather,
our research suggests the necessity of also accounting for
a negative aspect of human interaction on negotiation be-
havior: cynicism.
The current studies focused on the case of buyer-seller
interaction over a product that only the seller knows its
true value and has a clear incentive to sell regardless of
its value. Yet the seller cannot affect the product value
6The motivation for choosing this type of wording was to ensure that
sellers are aware that they are not restricted to reporting only the true
value of the hidden card.
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or the cost, and the properties of the product indicate that
its expected value to the buyer is higher than its costs. In
such a case rational buyers buy the products and ignore
the seller’s promises since they are merely “cheap talk”.
Yet the results of our two studies show that buyers who
communicate with sellers have a hard time ignoring such
communications, that many buyers end up not trusting the
seller after such communication, and that consequently
they miss valuable transactions. These results suggest that
the situation of being persuaded highlighted conflict and
decreased trust.
Future research should further explore the conditions
of human interaction in negotiation that foster the posi-
tive virtues of communication identified earlier rather than
the cynicism highlighted in the current work. There seem
to be several plausible mediators to the effects of com-
munication on trust. One relevant condition can be the
information disparity between parties. It could be that
communication facilitated buyers’ distrust because in the
current context communication highlights the seller’s in-
formational advantage. Indeed, most studies who have
found positive communication effects focused on situa-
tions where the parties held equivalent information (e.g.,
Cohen, Wildschut, & Insko, 2010).
Another relevant condition seems to be the commu-
nication channel. In the current studies we evaluated
computer-based communication. While this medium is in-
creasingly popular given the advances with today’s tech-
nology, alternative channels exist as well. Such channels
include face-to-face communication or talking over the
phone. Studies have found that interpersonal trust is typ-
ically lower with online negotiations than face to face in-
teractions (Naquin & Paulson, 2003; Valley et al., 1998).
Another interesting variable is the communication con-
tent. For example, Dawes et al. (1977) found that com-
munication that is relevant to the problem at hand facili-
tates more trust and cooperation than irrelevant communi-
cation. In the current context these findings imply that if
sellers would focus communication on things other than
the cards value they could have triggered even higher de-
gree of skepticism.
In addition to showing the potential downsides of com-
munication, the current research extends our knowledge of
perspective-taking in several meaningful ways. First, the
current studies emphasize that even considering the mo-
tives of another side does not necessarily imply that the
other side’s perspective is judged accurately. Buyers who
tried to take the seller’s perspective misjudged the sellers
to be less trustworthy than they actually were, and sellers
who tried to take the buyers’ perspective misjudged them
to be more positive towards persuasion attempts than they
were. Thus, although perspective-taking is typically ben-
eficial in conflict situations (see, e.g., Neale & Bazerman,
1983; and Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), the current re-
sults highlight conditions in which perspective-taking can
backfire (see also Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006; Ep-
ley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). Specifically, we find that
negative effects of perspective-taking are expected in situ-
ations where exploitation is possible (in our studies, from
the seller). Second, perspective-taking is generally viewed
as an “ability” that may reflect stable personality traits
(e.g., Davis, 1983; Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White
2008; Neale & Bazerman, 1983). While there are clearly
important individual differences in perspective-taking, the
current research suggests that perspective-taking can be
facilitated by properties of the negotiation context, at least
to some degree.
The current studies also promote our understanding of
the potential errors that might be associated with perspec-
tive taking. There are numerous situations in which peo-
ple fail to consider the other party’s motives and act too
naively. Examples include the trust game (Berg et al.,
1995), the Monty Hall Problem (e.g., Tor & Bazerman,
2003) and the Acquiring a Company Problem (Bazerman
& Samuelson, 1985). For instance, in the Acquiring a
Company problem a buyer decides to buy a target com-
pany that its value v is known only to the seller. The buyer
merely knows that v is uniformly distributed between 0
and 100, and that the seller sells the company provided it
is at a profitable price. If the buyer purchases the company
its value increases by 50%. In these conditions a rational
buyer should avoid acquiring the company since the selec-
tive acceptance implies negative expected returns. Yet the
typical bid is about $50, and it is surprisingly difficult to
educate people to bid lower (Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer &
Bazerman, 2007; Bereby-Meyer & Grosskopf, 2008).
The current studies suggest that such naïve behavior is
only part of the picture in situations that involve potential
lemon products. This observation raises a natural call for
exploring the boundaries of these two behavioral regulari-
ties to try clarifying when people are expected to be naïve
and when are they might be too cautious. Interestingly it
seems that in the studies that documented naïve responses
people made the first move (by bidding a price). In the
current settings, however, they had to decide whether to
accept an offer. Possibly the act of responding to a pro-
poser may increase the focus on the proposer’s character-
istics. This idea is somewhat supported from recent stud-
ies which showed that when people are asked to accept
offers, rather than choose actively, they tend to be more
risk/loss averse (Ert & Erev, 2008), and exhibit more fair-
ness concerns (Choshen-Hillel & Yaniv, 2011).
We believe that the study of naïvité, as well as other
potentially relevant mediators (e.g., feeling of control, op-
timism), will shed more light on the potential relation-
ships between these two, seemingly opposed, phenomena:
naïveté and skepticism. The current paper provided the
first step in this direction by showing that people might
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indeed become too skeptical in situations that they can ac-
tually benefit from, just because the situation highlights
some potential conflicts between the parties.
Finally, this paper extends the dialogue over whether
humans are too trusting or too cynical of other people.
We offer a clear contrast to the problem of too little cyni-
cism in the Acquiring a Company game. Similarly, Cain,
Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) show that people are too
trusting of agents. Cain et al. (2005) go on to demonstrate
that disclosure makes this inappropriate trust a more se-
vere error. Our results are a clear contrast to these research
paradigms. We do not see a disagreement. Rather, we
see this as a call for more research on when people are
too trusting and when they are too cynical. The answer
to this research can potentially improve trust and perfor-
mance across a variety of competitive domains.
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Appendix: Instructions
In the card game there are two players: a buyer and a seller.
Please take a look at your screen to see which role are you.
Before each game starts, you will be matched with a player
of the other type.
Buyers: when game starts you have cash of E200 (E1 =
$0.05).
Sellers: when game starts you have cash of E100 (E1 =
$0.05).7
In the card game there is a deck of 100 cards. Each card
is marked with a different number from 1 to 100. So the
cards are numbered as follows: 1, 2, . . . .., 98, 99, 100.
The cards in the deck are shuffled and then two cards
are drawn from the deck. Any card in the deck is equally
7The paragraphs in italics were added to the instructions in the
human-seller condition.
likely to be drawn. The seller holds and sees the two cards.
Then the seller’s goal is to sell the buyer both cards at
E100.
If the buyer decides to buy the cards then he pays the
seller E100. The buyer receives the sum of the two cards
minus their cost, in addition to his/her remaining cash. For
example, if the cards are 1 and 2 the buyer gets 3(sum)-
100(cost) +200(cash) = E103, and if the cards are 99 and
100 the buyer gets 199(sum)-100(cost)+200(cash) = E299.
Alternatively, if the buyer does not buy the cards then
the buyer keeps his/her cash. Sellers have to return the
cards to the stock (the pile of cards) and do not get their
sum.
Before making a decision to accept or reject the seller’s
offer, the seller will show the buyer only the LOWER of
the two cards he/she has on hand. The seller will then try
to convince the buyer to buy the cards by sending the buyer
text messages. Sellers have 1 minute to convince buyers to
buy.
Sellers: as you will see, there are various cases in which
the cards are not valuable to buyers. You are allowed to
sell such cards if you can convince the buyer to buy. Also,
if you do not wish to, you do not have to send the buyer
any message.
Buyers: you can reply to the seller, but you are also
allowed not to respond if you do not wish to.
There are no rules regarding true or false informa-
tion you choose to send in your messages, anything is
allowed! The only restriction is that the buyer and seller
are not allowed to reveal any information that might
identify them (e.g., name, station, etc.).
You will now play two different independent games of
this card game. Each time you play you will be matched
with a different player from the other type. In one of the
games the LOWER card will be prefixed by the experi-
menter for technical purposes. At the end of the study
one game will be randomly selected (each game is equally
likely to be selected) and your payment will be determined
by your earning in that game.
